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I. INTRODUCTION
Thanks in part to several recent well-publicized cases,l the public has
become very familiar with the notion that insider trading is prohibited; that is, that
corporate insiders may not use material, nonpublic information to help them profit
from buying and selling their company's securities. Those familiar with the
securities laws also know that whenever insiders of publicly held companies buy
or sell their company's securities, they must file reports with the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") that disclose their trades to the public, whether or
not the trades are based on inside information. If insiders profit from a purchase
and sale of their company's securities within six months, they must return the
profit to the company. This Article examines the disclosure/disgorgement
obligation from several angles. It considers the rationales for the obligation and
determines that the statute requiring insiders to disclose their trades and disgorge
their profits does not fulfill its stated objectives. It then queries whether the statute
does or could fulfill other objectives, and it suggests how the law might be
improved.
The Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act")2 prescribes a system of
registration and disclosure in connection with issuances of securities, and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act")3 prescribes a registration
system for classes of securities and periodic mandatory disclosure by issuers of
such securities. Companies that offer securities to the public must register those
securities under the 1933 Act in a filing with the SEC that includes specified
information about the company and its business, management, and finances.4
Companies that meet certain size criteria or whose securities trade on national
exchanges must also register their publicly traded securities with the SEC under
the 1934 Act.5 Companies with securities registered under the 1934 Act are
1. The most recent case, which broadens the government's ability to prosecute
persons unaffiliated with the issuing company who trade on nonpublic information, was
handed down by the United States Supreme Court in late June, 1997. United States v.
O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997); see infra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
2. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1994).
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1994).
4. See Securities Act of 1933, §§ 5-7, 10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-77g, 77j (1994).
5. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12, 15 U.S.C. §781 (1994).
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required to file reports with the SEC at the end of each year and each quarter,
publicly disclosing on an ongoing basis information similar to that provided in
securities registration statements. 6
Section 16 of the 1934 Act7 is intended to discourage insider trading, that
is, trading on the basis of material nonpublic information acquired through the
insider's relationship with a company. The statute does not directly prohibit
insider trading, but instead removes the profit from, and thus the incentive for, a
class of transactions deemed likely to involve the use of inside information.8
Under section 16, officers, directors, and major shareholders of publicly held
companies must report their trades in their company's securities to the SEC and to
the exchanges on which the securities trade.9 If the reports disclose that an insider
has profited from a purchase and sale within a six-month period, either the
company or any of its security holders may bring an action to compel the insider
to disgorge the profit and return it to the company. 10
Two quirks in the statute ensure that its net ensnares the largest possible
group of trades. First, it is irrelevant whether the puichase precedes the sale or the
sale precedes the purchase. As long as the purchase price is less than the sale price,
section 16(b) deems that there is a recoverable profit." Second, the statute does
not bundle together all transactions within a six-month period to determine
whether the insider has a cumulative profit. Instead, it matches the lowest purchase
price with the highest sale price to require disgorgement of the largest possible
"profit." As a result, an insider could actually have a cumulative loss resulting
from a series of trades within a six-month period and still be required to disgorge
"profits" back to his or her company.12
In addition to these quirks, section 16(b) makes no inquiry into whether
inside information was a factor motivating a transaction that resulted in a profit for
the trader. It operates instead on the irrebuttable presumption that any transaction
that falls within its prohibition and results in a profit to the trader, as section 16
6. See id. § 13, 15 U.S.C. §78m (1994).
7. Id. § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1994).
8. See id. § 16(b).
9. Id. § 16(a).
10. Id. § 16(b).
11. For example, CEO buys 100 shares of her company's stock at $30 and sells
them a month later at $40. She has a $1,000 profit, and section 16(b) will require her to
disgorge the profit and return it to her company. If instead, she sells 100 shares at $40 and
buys 100 shares a month later at $30, section 16(b) will still apply, because the sale price
was higher than the purchase price. It will require her to disgorge her profit of $1,000-the
$10 difference between the purchase price and the sale price, times the number of shares.
12. For instance, CEO might purchase 500 shares at $50 per share in March, sell
500 for $40 per share in April, purchase 500 for $30 in May, and sell 500 for $20 in June.
Although CEO is clearly not a successful investor (with a cumulative loss of $10,000),
section 16(b) would impose liability of $5,000 for the "profit" of $10 per share between the
May purchase price of $30 and the April sale price of $40.
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defines profit, will create liability and require disgorgement of the profit back to
the issuer.
This Article concludes that section 16(b) should be repealed and section
16(a) should be modified. Section 16(b) should be repealed for several reasons.
First, it is ineffective at preventing or punishing insider trading.13 Its bright-line
rule both punishes transactions not based on improper use of inside information
and fails to punish transactions based on such information.14 Second, it is unfair,
because its ineffectiveness means that those who do in fact trade on inside
information, and thus should have to pay, may escape section 16(b) liability, while
those who are merely uninformed or unwary may be caught by the statute's
irrebuttable presumption.1s Third, it is expensive, because it requires both
corporations and insiders to govern their conduct by complex rules unrelated to the
actual misuse of inside information.16 And fourth, it is unnecessary, because there
13. See infra Part II.C.
14. In a recent article, Professor Marc Steinberg and Daryl Landsdale posit that
both courts and regulators have recently taken steps to weaken the enforcement of section
16(b). The authors note that language in a recent decision may narrow the class of potential
parties who have standing to bring suit, that recent decisions pose the risk that courts will
restrictively interpret the limitations period applicable to section 16(b) claims, and that the
SEC itself has promulgated rules that remove some transactions in derivative securities
from the purview of the statute. The authors believe that these developments are all in
contravention of the statute's broad remedial purpose. See Marc I. Steinberg & Daryl L.
Landsdale, Jr., The Judicial and Regulatory Constriction of Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 68 NomE DAME L. Rv. 33 (1992). This reluctance to vigorously
enforce section 16 may result at least in part from the widely held perception that it is
frequently overbroad.
15. See S.S. Samuelson, The Prevention of Insider Trading: A Proposal for
Revising Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 511
(1988).
A half century of experience with Section 16 and recent analysis by
economists of insider trading reveal that the Act has not prevented
insiders from profiting at the expense of other shareholders and the
general public. The evidence also suggests that corporate officials not
only earn a higher return than the market when trading stock of their
own companies, but that insiders frequently trade while in possession of
secret, material information. Indeed, since the statute only regulates
round-trip trading, it does not prohibit single trades based on secret
information. At the same time, Section 16 imposes a heavy burden on
corporate insiders by preventing many legitimate trades (i.e., those made
without inside information). The reporting requirements often snag not
the guilty but the unwary.
Id. at 512 (footnotes omitted).
16. See infra Part III.D; see also Merrit B. Fox, Insider Trading Deterrence
Versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory of Section 16(b), 92 MICH. L. REv. 2088,
2201 (1994) ("Critics assert that [section 16(b)] is totally ineffective in combatting insider
trading because all that an insider needs to do to avoid its bite is to wait six months before
reversing the trade.").
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is an abundance of other laws and rules that either are intended to combat insider
trading or may be used for that purpose.1 7
Section 16(a), unlike section 16(b), serves a useful purpose and thus
should not be repealed. Section 16(a) reports provide valuable information to the
market, even though the meaning of the information is not always clearn The fact
that insiders have bought or sold their company's securities may provide insights
into their opinions of the company's prospects. This information will tend to make
securities prices more accurate, in the sense that the prices will include more
information. However, section 16(a) currently allows much too long a delay
between the time an insider trades and the time the trade must be reported.
Therefore, this Article recommends that the section be amended to require a filing
concurrent with the trade and suggests that the concurrent filing can be
implemented easily through use of the SEC's EDGAR system.1 8
II. SECTION 16: PURPOSE AND OPERATION
A. Legislative History
As the Great Depression reached its nadir in the years following the stock
market crash of 1929, Congress enacted the 1933 and 1934 securities acts. These
laws were intended in part to restore public confidence in the fairness of the
markets. Confidence was low because the public believed the stock markets were
"rigged" in favor of those who had access to inside information about the
companies whose stock was traded. Investors without inside information were thus
reluctant to risk their money in the market. Their reluctance to invest, in turn,
made it more difficult for companies to raise the capital needed to stay afloat
during the hard times of the Great Depression. Congress believed that by
increasing the public's access to information, it could reduce both the perception
and the reality that the playing field was slanted. Therefore, the securities laws
17. See infra Part III. The Supreme Court's recent O'Hagan decision reinforces
the position that the government has a heavy arsenal of weapons with which to combat
insider trading. O'Hagan stands for the proposition that someone who acquires material
nonpublic information in a confidential relationship, even if that relationship is with
someone other than the issuer, may be prosecuted for "misappropriating" that information
and trading on it for his or her own benefit. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199
(1997).
18. EDGAR, the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system, is
the SEC's system for both receiving and disseminating information electronically.
Companies file their registration statements and periodic reports electronically, using the
telephone lines, and both the SEC and the public can access the filed information. See infra
Part IV.B.3 for more information about EDGAR.
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were designed to increase investment by requiring disclosure of certain
information.1 9
B. Statutory Scheme: 16(a) Reporting and 16(b) Liability
Section 16 has three subsections that set out its requirements and two
additional subsections that limit its scope. Section 16(a) requires certain statutorily
defined "insiders"20 to report their beneficial ownership2l of and their transactions
in their company's securities both to the SEC and to the stock exchanges on which
the securities are listed. Insiders must file an initial report when their company's
securities are registered under section 12 or within ten days after becoming
statutory insiders.22 This provides baseline information on securities ownership.
Following the initial report, insiders must file transaction reports by the tenth day
of the month following any month in which there has been a substantial23 change
19. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 73-792, at 3-5 (1934):
The unfair methods of speculation employed by large operators and
those possessing inside information regarding corporate affairs, and the
failure of corporations to publish full and fair reports of their financial
conditions, have also been contributing causes of losses to investors.
The three principal problems with which the bill deals are the
excessive use of credit for speculation, the unfair practices employed in
speculation, and the secrecy surrounding the financial condition of
corporations which invite the public to purchase their securities.
20. Section 16(a) defines those insiders subject to its requirements as "[e]very
person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of any
class of any equity security (other than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant
to section 781 of this title [(section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934)], or who is a
director or an officer of the issuer of such security." Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §
16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1994).
21. "Beneficial ownership" is used in two senses in section 16. One sense relates
to the opportunity to realize pecuniary benefit from securities ownership, and the other
relates to the power to control the voting and disposition of the securities. A person
becomes an insider required to file reports under section 16(a) if he or she meets the control
tests set out in section 13(d) and the rules promulgated thereunder. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)
(1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (1997); id. § 240.16a-l(a)(1). But for other purposes,
including liability under section 16(b), beneficial ownership refers to a person's pecuniary
interest in the securities. See id. § 240.16a-l(a)(2).
22. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a).
23. Rule 16a-6 permits insiders to delay filing reports of their securities
acquisitions that total $10,000 or less until the next time they are otherwise required to file
a monthly report on Form 4 or an annual report on Form 5, subject to certain conditions. 17
C.F.R. 240.16a-6.
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in their ownership,24 and they must also file annual statements of beneficial
ownership.25
Section 16(b) states that it was enacted "[fjor the purpose of preventing
the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by... [a statutory
insider] by reason of his relationship to the issuer." 26 It prohibits insiders from
24. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a). Rules 16a-1 through 16a-10
provide explanations and exemptions from reporting for some transactions that the SEC has
determined do not pose the dangers of insider trading that Section 16 is designed to
forestall. For instance, Rule 16a-9 provides that stock splits and stock dividends are not
reportable transactions, and Rule 16a-6 permits small transactions to be reported at the end
of the fiscal year rather than on a monthly basis. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.16a-1 to 240.16a-
10.
25. The initial statement of beneficial ownership is filed on SEC Form 3, the
statement of changes in beneficial ownership is filed on Form 4, and the annual statement is
filed on Form 5. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3(a) (1997). The annual report on Form 5 must
be filed by the 45th day after the end of the issuer's fiscal year and must disclose the
following if not reported previously on Forms 3, 4, or 5:
(i) all transactions during the most recent fiscal year that were
exempt from Section 16(b) of the Act, except:
(A) Exercises and conversions of derivative
securities exempt under either § 240.16b-3 or § 240.16b-6(b)
(these are required to be reported on Form 4);
(B) Transactions exempt from Section 16(b) of the
Act pursuant to § 240.16b-3(c), which shall be exempt from
Section 16(a) of the Act; and
(C) Transactions exempt from Section 16(a) of the
Act pursuant to another rule;
(ii) Transactions that constituted small acquisitions pursuant to
§ 240.16a-6(a);
(iii) All holdings and transactions that should have been
reported during the most recent fiscal year, but were not; and
(iv) With respect to the first Form 5 requirement for a
reporting person, all holdings and transactions that should have been
reported in each of the issuer's last two fiscal years but were not, based
on the reporting person's reasonable belief in good faith in the
completeness and accuracy of the information.
Id. § 240.16a-3(f). Insiders need not file Form 5 if they have already reported all
transactions that would otherwise be reported on Form 5. Id.
26. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b). But see Karl Shumpei Okamoto,
Rereading Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 27 GA. L. REV. 183 (1992)
(proposing that section 16, its preamble to the contrary, was not in fact intended to prevent
insider trading, but was instead intended to prevent market manipulation). "[B]oth as a
matter of finance theory and of history, insiders have the ability to artificially move stock
prices simply by trading. Section 16(b) addresses this opportunity for abuse." Id. at 186; cf.
Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16. Regulating the Management of Publicly Held
Companies, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 393 (1991) (noting that section 16(b) has value outside its
insider trading function because its six-month holding period tends to align managerial
incentives with long-term profitability).
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making a profit on transactions in their company's securities when the purchase
and sale of the securities both occur within a six-month period. Insiders must
disgorge any profit realized in this kind of "short swing" transaction and return it
to the company. The remainder of section 16 is not dealt with in this Article.
Section 16(c) prevents insiders from profiting from downturns in the price of their
company's securities by prohibiting short sales and sales "against the box."27
Subsections (d) and (e) exempt certain transactions from the coverage of section
16.28
C. Problems with Scope of Coverage
Section 16 has been criticized as being both underinclusive and
overinclusive.29 The persons, companies, and transactions to which it applies are
defined by arbitrary, bright-line classifications rather than by an inquiry into
whether inside information was in fact used in a particular trade. This is perhaps
understandable in light of the congressional aim to remove the perception of
unfairness from the capital markets, but perception may belie reality: the statute's
net may fail to catch genuine miscreants more often than not.
27. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(c). In a short sale, the seller does not
actually own the stock. Instead, the seller borrows stock, generally from his or her broker,
and sells it in the market. The seller must at some later time replace the borrowed securities
by purchasing replacement securities in the market. Sellers engage in short selling in the
hope and/or expectation that the market price will decline. Then the replacement securities
may be purchased at a lower price than that received in the sale of the borrowed securities,
thus creating a profit from the transaction.
Sales "against the box" are similar to short sales, in that they involve the use of
borrowed securities. However, in a sale "against the box," the seller owns securities
substantially identical to those sold, but chooses to deliver borrowed securities instead.
28. Id. § 16(d), (e).
29. See, e.g., Thel, supra note 26.
It is hombook law that the purpose of section 16 is to keep corporate
insiders from trading on the basis of inside information; the statute says
almost as much. The problem is that section 16 does not always keep
those who possess inside information from trading, and the people it
does keep from trading do not always possess inside information. Robert
Clark has captured the conventional criticism: "Section 16(b) catches
defendants who did not violate the policy decision underlying the rule
(here, the decision that trading on inside information is unfair), and it
fails to catch other defendants who did violate it."
Id. at 396-97 (footnotes omitted). Professor Thel's article goes on to suggest that this
understanding of section 16's purpose is incorrect, or at least too limited. Instead, he posits
that section 16 is quite effective at encouraging those who control public companies to
operate them efficiently because it deters them "from manipulating corporate affairs for
their own ends, and it encourages them to acquire a personal interest in the long-term
success of those corporations." Id. at 393.
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Section 16 regulates the trades of a defined group of officers, directors,
and substantial stockholders.30 This group of insiders recognized by the statute
may be underinclusive in any particular case because it does not necessarily
include all corporate employees who have valuable inside information. It may also
be overinclusive, because it applies to the defined group of insiders regardless of
whether they in fact have (or even have access to) inside information.
Section 16's requirements apply only to insiders of companies with
equity securities registered under section 12 of the 1934 Act.31 Section 12
companies are fairly large, publicly held companies.32 Many companies. are not
registered or required to register under section 12. Section 16 does nothing to
discourage insider trading by persons outside its defined class of insiders or by
persons who fit within the insider definition but are affiliated with companies not
registered under section 12.
The most obvious scope problem, however, is not with the group of
persons or companies covered but with the transaction period. Section 16(b)
applies only to purchase/sale or sale/purchase transactions in which both the
purchase and sale occur within a six-month period.33 It does not inquire whether a
trader in fact used inside information but instead sets an arbitrary time period
during which profits are prohibited. It is thus overinclusive because it requires
disgorgement of profits realized on trades within the six-month limit, even when
the trades were not motivated by inside information. This overinclusiveness is
harmful, not just neutral. First, it discourages insiders from owning securities in
their companies, and securities ownership by insiders is generally beneficial
30. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a). See supra note 20 for the statutory
definition of insiders. It is generally fairly clear who are the directors (although there may
be some question about honorary or emeritus directors) and 10% shareholders of an issuer,
but the scope of the "officer" classification is not as clear. Lower level employees, even if
they are titled "officers," are less likely to' have access to material inside information, and
thus are less likely to engage in the insider trading that section 16 is intended to deter.
Consequently, Rule 16a-l(f) defines officer to include "an issuer's president, principal
financial officer, principal accounting officer [or controller], any vice-president.. .in charge
of a principal business unit, division or function..., any other officer who performs a
policy-making function, or any other person who performs similar policy-making functions
for the issuer." 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-l(f). Officers of related corporations or partners or
employees of related partnerships may also be considered officers of the issuer if they
"perform such policy-making functions for the issuer." Id.
31. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a).
32. An issuer must register its securities under section 12 in either of two
instances. Section 12(b) requires registration when a security becomes listed on a national
securities exchange, and section 12(g) requires registration when the issuer has more than
$1,000,000 in assets and at least 500 shareholders. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §
12(b), (g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(b), (g) (1994). Rule 12g-1 modifies section 12(g)(1) to exempt
from the registration requirement any issuer with assets not exceeding $10,000,000. 17
C.F.R. § 240.12g-1.
33. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b).
1997] 1323
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because it decreases agency costs by aligning managerial and shareholder
incentives.34 Second, it discourages insider transactions altogether, which keeps
valuable information out of the market. But section 16(b) is not only
overinclusive, it is also underinclusive. It has no impact on transactions outside the
six-month period, even if they were in fact based on the improper use of inside
information. Therefore, it would not require disgorgement of profits that were
admittedly achieved by relying on inside information as long as the trades were
spaced more than six months apart.
There is no sound basis for the statute's use of a six-month period rather
than six weeks or six years, other than the intuition that inside information is likely
either to lose its inside character and become public or to lose its trading value
within a reasonably short period. In 1934, Congress apparently believed that the
six-month period would capture a fairly large proportion of the transactions in
which there might be an opportunity to profit from the use of inside infornation.35
Were the issue to be revisited today, legislators might conclude that the short-
swing period could be considerably shorter. Since 1934, there have been vast
increases in the speed of communication and transportation. There is currently a
large corps of market analysts who are vigilant in their search for information
about the companies they follow. These developments, together with the SEC's
trend toward encouraging companies to provide more forward-looking, "soft"
information, might make it substantially more difficult to keep information secret
for as long as six months. Therefore, Congress, were it enacting section 16(b)
today, might well choose a shorter period.
A final problem with section 16 has to do with its enforcement. If an
insider makes a short-swing profit as defined in section 16, any shareholder of the
issuer may ask the issuer to require the insider to disgorge the profit.36 If the
company fails to do so within sixty days, the shareholder may file suit to compel
34. See generally Fox, supra note 16 (commenting that section 16(b) does
reduce trades based on inside information, but that it also makes it less attractive for
managers to own stock in their companies, which increases the agency costs of monitoring
managers to make sure that they act in the best interests of shareholders).
There are strong theoretical reasons to believe that it is good social
policy to encourage practices that increase managerial wealth when
share price increases. A manager faced with a choice between an action
that would increase shareholder wealth and one that would not is more
likely to choose the one that does if that choice would increase her
personal wealth as well. This flows from the most fundamental
proposition in economics-that people are rational maximizers of their
own wealth.
Id. at 2100.
35. See Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading, Part II:
Reform of Section 16, 42 Bus. LAw. 1087, 1130 (1987) [hereinafter Report of the Task
Force].
36. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b).
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disgorgement.37 Plaintiffs' attorneys are permitted to recover their fees in these
actions, 38 so a "section 16 bar" has developed to handle disgorgement cases.39
Attorneys who specialize in this work regularly examine filings made pursuant to
section 16(a) in order to discover potential short-swing profits. They then procure
a shareholder of the company to act as the nominal plaintiff, but the suit is often
motivated by attorney fees rather than by any shareholder concern.40 The nominal
plaintiff need not even have been a shareholder at the time of the section 16(b)
violation.41 The SEC has commented in favor of private actions, noting that they
37. Interestingly, the SEC itself has no authority to enforce section 16.
Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any
court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any
security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer
shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request or
shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter....
Id.
38. Although the statute itself does not mandate recovery of attorney fees, courts
have consistently allowed their recovery based on equitable considerations. See, e.g.,
Gilson v. Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 326 F.2d 246, 248 (2d Cir. 1964), modified in banc,
331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964). One court has noted that, "[s]ince in many cases such as this
the possibility of recovering attorney's fees will provide the sole stimulus for the
enforcement of § 16(b), the allowance must not be too niggardly." Smolowe v. Delendo
Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1943).
39. See Edward F. Giltenan, A Frustrating Experience, FoRBEs, Apr. 2, 1990, at
138 (describing an unsuccessful section 16 suit from the defendant's perspective); see also
John C. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 CoLUM.
L. REv. 669 (1986) (suggesting that collusive or extortionate litigation might be reduced by
shifting compensation for plaintiffs' attorneys away from hourly billing toward a
percentage of the recovery).
40. In one case, if plaintiff won, his pro rata share of the corporation's recovery
amounted to only $1.10. Although plaintiff's attorney asserted that plaintiff had orally
agreed to pay his fees if the suit was unsuccessful, the defendants claimed the suit was
champertous, claiming that it was unreasonable to believe that, for such a negligible
recovery, the plaintiff would risk being obligated for substantial attorney fees and costs if
he lost. The court refused to allow the defendants to assert the defense of champerty,
opining that
even if.. .[champerty] were fully capable of proof, it would be
insufficient in law to defeat the suit. The action is brought on behalf of
the corporation to protect the rights of stockholders and of the public.
The relationship between his attorney and the plaintiff, who is the mere
vehicle of recovery, cannot defeat the rights of the corporation and other
stockholders, to whom the recovery accrues.
Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir. 1956).
41. See, e.g., Jammies Int'l, Inc. v. Lazarus, 713 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(plaintiff owned a single share of stock, which was purchased after the alleged short-swing
trading). See also Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1968), in which an
attorney was allowed to recover fees for his work in investigating and discovering a section
16(b) violation, even though no suit was filed-the corporation was able to persuade the
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have the capacity to aid its enforcement of the securities laws and provide more
protection to the public than it could on its budget alone. 42 But even if private
plaintiffs can in theory be a useful aid to the SEC in enforcing the securities laws,
they pose some troubling issues in the section 16 context.
One issue is that the company may recover nothing, yet the plaintiffs
attorney must still be paid out of company funds.43 Another is that even if the
insider is forced to disgorge a profit to the company, section 16 does not ensure
that the profit was garnered by wrongfully using inside information. Since the
statute provides a prophylactic, bright-line rule that depends on form rather than
substance, no deliberate wrongdoing need be proven, and, in fact, may not exist.
Therefore, the equities of allowing private enforcement of section 16 seem
suspect; although the action is ostensibly to recover ill-gotten gains for the
company, the gains may not be ill gotten in the sense of involving any conscious
wrongdoing: the company may recover nothing, and the plaintiffs attorney may
be the only one who gains-at the expense of the company the suit was nominally
intended to benefit.
D. Benefits of Section 16
Although its shortcomings are obvious and plentiful, section 16 may
provide some benefits. First, it may in some instances prevent trades based on
inside information.44 Insiders of large companies are routinely instructed by
insider to disgorge his profits without legal action. The Blau court noted that such fees
should not be allowed for attorney efforts immediately following disclosure of such trades
because it believed that corporations should have some incentive to uncover violations and
pursue illegal profits on their own. "[O]nly when it is likely that the corporation would
have done nothing" is it appropriate for a court to require the corporation to pay for an
attorney's efforts in discovering a violation. Id. at 474.
42. In 1995, Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the SEC, testified before a House
subcommittee in connection with passage of legislation that eventually was enacted as the
Private Securities Litigation Enforcement Act of 1995. Chairman Levitt noted:
Besides serving as the primary vehicle for remedies against securities
fraud, private actions also provide a "necessary supplement" to the
Commission's own enforcement activities by serving to deter securities
law violations. Private actions are crucial to the integrity of our
disclosure system because they provide a direct incentive for issuers and
other market participants to meet their obligations under the securities
laws.
141 CONG. REc. D175-76 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1995) (footnote omitted) (testimony of Arthur
Levitt, Chairman of SEC); see also 141 CONG. REc. D273 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995)
(testimony of former SEC member J. Carter Beese, Jr.) ("If we were to wholly eliminate
private rights of action, as some commentators have suggested and rely solely on state law
and the SEC's limited resources for enforcement of the federal securities laws, we run the
risk of encouraging misconduct by market participants." (footnote omitted)).
43. See Gilson, 326 F.2d 246; Smolowe, 136 F.2d at 241.
44. Henry Manne and others would argue that preventing such trades is not
necessarily a benefit. See, e.g., HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET
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company counsel about their section 16(a) obligations to file and the section 16(b)
prohibitions on short-swing profits.45 To the extent that insiders are aware of the
strictures of section 16, they will doubtless try to avoid trades that create liability.
This, of course, will eliminate both innocent and guilty trades-whether or not an
insider is in possession of material nonpublic information, he or she will attempt to
avoid a prohibited short-swing profit.
Second, the prohibition on short-swing profits tends to align insiders'
incentives with creating long-term, rather than short-term, gain. Section 16(b)
encourages insiders to hold their company's securities for longer than six months,
at least if the market for those securities is rising. As a result, interest in
maximizing the value of their own investments should encourage insiders to focus
on achieving longer-term growth and profitability for their companies. Section
16(b) should thus have at least a slight tendency to encourage managers to invest
company resources in research, development, invention, and innovation rather
than in opportunities that provide quick profits but have less long-term value.
Section 16's most valuable contribution, however, is the information
provided to the market in the form of section 16(a) reports. As discussed in greater
detail below in Part IV.B, the news that insiders have bought or sold their
company's securities has informational value. Even if trades by insiders are not
based on specific nonpublic information, they are likely to be based on the most
informed opinions available regarding the company's prospects. Therefore, section
16(a) reports provide insights into valuation that can inform the market as a whole.
(1966); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35
STAN. L. REv. 857, 861 (1983) (suggesting that allowing insider trading "may be an
efficient way to compensate corporate managers").
45. See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS,
INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 1057 (5th ed. 1994).
Today, general counsel of issuers of registered securities regularly
distribute cautionary memoranda to directors, officers, large
shareholders, and employees who may have access to nonpublic material
information. Since 1988, these memoranda have been virtually required
by ITSFEA [the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677], but even before the
enactment of that statute, such memoranda were widely used. They
universally described the possible application of section 16(b),
cautioning the reader of the dangers of inadvertent violations from
innocent transactions and recommending that officers, directors, and ten
percent shareholders obtain legal advice before exercising employee
stock options, making gifts of securities, exercising conversion
privileges, or generally acquiring or disposing of equity securities when
any possible offsetting transactions exist.
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II. SECTION 16(b) AND OTHER LAWS TO COMBAT INSIDER
TRADING
Although section 16(a) provides valuable information to the market,
section 16(b) may be unnecessary, both for the reasons already discussed, and
because its function is duplicated or better accomplished by other laws. Several
statutes and rules directly or indirectly prohibit the use of material nonpublic
information in securities trading. Some of these are much more clearly focused on
that problem than section 16. As a result, the limited role that section 16 could
play in controlling the use of inside information in securities trading is already
performed more fairly and efficiently by other regulation. The following sections
identify some of these other provisions and briefly outline how each operates to
deter insider trading.
A. Federal Securities Laws
1. Section 10(b) and Rule J0b-5
Section 10(b) is a general fraud provision that, like section 16, is part of
the Secjrities Exchange Act of 1934. Rule lOb-546 was promulgated in 1943.47
Although the rule covers all kinds of fraud in connection with securities
transactions, it has frequently been employed in insider trading cases. 48 The cases
make it clear that Rule lOb-5 prohibits the use, in connection with the purchase or
46. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1997). The Rule states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
47. See Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus.
LAW. 793, 922 (1967) (comments of Milton Freeman). These comments indicate that Rule
10b-5 was drafted in response to a situation in which a company president told
shareholders the company was doing poorly, when it in fact was doing very well, in order
to buy their stock at discounted prices.
48. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997); Carpenter v.
United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (in
banc); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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sale of securities, of material49 information acquired by an officer or director of
the company as a result of his or her relationship with the companySo until that
information has been effectively disseminated to the public.51 Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5, unlike section 16, do not apply only to section 12 companies5 2 but are
49. "Materiality" for purposes of Rule lOb-5 was defined by the Supreme Court
in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). Justice Blackmun noted that the Court had
previously defined a standard of materiality in the case of TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), which involved a proxy solicitation. Adapting this standard to
the Rule lOb-5 context, the Court held that "'[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable [investor] would consider it important"' in making
an investment decision. Basic, 485 U.S. at 231 (quoting TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 449).
Recognizing that materiality can vary with the circumstances, the Basic Court
approved the balancing approach for determining materiality set forth in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., holding that, "with respect to contingent or speculative information or
events, ...materiality 'will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both the indicated
probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of
the totality of the company activity."' Id. at 238 (quoting Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at
849).
50. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (an administrative
proceeding by the SEC against a broker who had traded on information acquired from an
insider). The SEC found that trading on inside information violated Rule lOb-5. It noted
that the obligation to refrain from trading on inside information
rests on two principal elements; first, the existence of a relationship
giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of
anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes
advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with
whom he is dealing.
Id. at 912.
51. See, e.g., Teras Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833. The court found TGS director
Coates liable for insider trading even though he did not purchase the TGS securities until
after the material inside information had been announced to the public.
The reading of a news release, which prompted Coates into action, is
merely the first step in the process of dissemination required for
compliance with the regulatory objective of providing all investors with
an equal opportunity to make informed investment judgments.
Assuming that the contents of the official release could instantaneously
be acted upon, at the minimum Coates should have waited until the news
could reasonably have been expected to appear over the media of widest
circulation, the Dow Jones broad tape, rather than hastening to insure an
advantage to himself and his broker son-in-law.
Id. at 854.
52. Section 10(b) provides that it is unlawful
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
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instead applicable to virtually all securities transactions. 53
Rule lOb-5 is limited by the concept of fiduciary duty.54 One who trades
on material nonpublic information without making any affirmative misstatement
does not violate rule lOb-5 unless he or she has a duty to disclose the information
before trading.55 Classically, the plaintiff or prosecutor had to show that the
defendant trader owed a fiduciary duty to the issuer. A recent United States
Supreme Court opinion describes this understanding of Rule 1Ob-5:
Under the "traditional" or "classical theory" of insider
trading liability, § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 are violated when a
corporate insider trades in the securities of his corporation on the
basis of material, nonpublic information.... The classical theory
applies not only to officers, directors, and other permanent insiders
of a corporation, but also to attorneys, accountants, consultants, and
others who temporarily become fiduciaries of a corporation.56
Using this traditional theory, the United States Supreme Court held in
1980 that the employee of a financial printer who traded on nonpublic information
he gleaned from his job had no liability under Rule lOb-5 because he had no
relationship with the issuer or its shareholders that would create a duty to
disclose.57 Similarly, the Court held in the 1983 Dirks58 case that a "tippee"-one
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
53. The federal securities laws apply only when there is some use of the means
of interstate commerce. A simple telephone call or use of the U.S. mail, however, will
satisfy that jurisdictional requirement. As a result, nearly all securities transactions will be
subject to Rule lOb-5.
54. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907.
55. "[S]ilence in connection with the purchase or sale of securities may operate
as a fraud actionable under § 10(b).... But such liability is premised upon a duty to disclose
arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction."
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980).
56. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997); see also, United
States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1991) (in banc).
57. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235. The Court noted that "a duty to disclose under §
10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information." Id.
[O]ne who fails to disclose material information prior to the
consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a
duty to do so. And the duty to disclose arises when one party has
information "that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a
fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between
them."
Id. at 228 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF
TORTs § 551(2)(a) (1976)). Although the Chiarella decision confined its fiduciary duty
inquiry, the recent O'Hagan case broadened the inquiry to ask whether the trader had
misappropriated nonpublic information. Under the misappropriation theory, Chiarella
would probably be found guilty today. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199.
58. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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who receives material nonpublic information from an insider-does not violate
Rule lOb-5 by trading on that information unless the insider "tipper" breached a
fiduciary duty to the issuer in passing the information to the tippee.59 These cases
illuminated a sizeable gap in Rule lOb-5's prohibition of trading on inside
information. The SEC and many others felt considerable discomfort that persons
like Chiarella, who had deliberately violated his employer's rules by trading, could
profit legally from using inside information.60 This discomfort was eased when the
Court decided the 1997 case of United States v. O'Hagan.61 In O'Hagan, the
Court adopted the broader reading advocated by Chief Justice Burger in
Chiarella,62 holding that Rule lOb-5 may be employed to prosecute persons who
trade on nonpublic information, even if those persons have no relationship to the
issuer, if they "misappropriated" the information.63
O'Hagan arose out of the tender offer by Grand Metropolitan PLC for the
stock of the Pillsbury Company. Grand Metropolitan retained Dorsey & Whitney,
the Minneapolis law firm of which O'Hagan was a member, to represent it.
Although O'Hagan did not work on the project (and his law firm actually resigned
from the representation before the tender offer occurred), he became aware that
the tender offer was contemplated. He purchased stock and call options for
Pillsbury stock, and when the tender offer was announced, reaped profits
exceeding $4.3 million. He was prosecuted in federal court, was convicted on 57
counts of mail fraud, securities fraud, and money laundering, and was sentenced to
prison. He appealed, and the Eighth Circuit reversed the lower court on all counts,
finding, among other things, that because O'Hagan had no relationship to
Pillsbury (the company whose securities he traded) he was not guilty of violating
Rule lOb-5.64
59. In Dirks, Ron Secrist, an employee of Equity Funding of America, a large
insurance company, disclosed to Dirks that his company was involved in fraud of massive
dimensions. Id. at 649. Dirks investigated Secrist's charges and tried to convince the Wall
Street Journal to publicize the story, but it declined for fear of libel actions. Id. at 649-50.
Dirks owned no Equity Funding stock himself, but he advised his clients to sell their Equity
Funding stock. Id. at 651. In an action against Dirks for trading on the nonpublic
information, the Court held that Secrist had breached no duty to Equity Funding when he
disclosed the wrongdoing, so Dirks had not violated Rule lOb-5 by trading on the
information. Id. at 667.
60. Indeed, in a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger advocated for a broader
reading of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 "to mean that a person who has misappropriated
nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or refrain from
trading." Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). However, the majority
opinion noted that this "misappropriation" theory was not submitted to the jury, and thus
could not be the basis for affirming Chiarella's criminal conviction. Id. at 235-36.
61. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
62. See supra note 60.
63. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2210-11.
64. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2199
(1997).
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the appellate court.
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg noted that even though O'Hagan had no
relationship with Pillsbury that would give rise to a fiduciary duty, he did have
such a relationship with his employer, Dorsey & Whitney.
The "misappropriation theory" holds that a person
commits fraud "in connection with" a securities transaction, and
thereby violates § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates
confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of
a duty owed to the source of the information.... In lieu of premising
liability on a fiduciary relationship between company insider and
purchaser or seller of the company's stock, the misappropriation
theory premises liability on a fiduciary-tumed-trader's deception of
those who entrusted him with access to confidential information.65
Although the Supreme Court had been asked twice previously to rule on
the validity of the misappropriation theory as a basis for Rule lOb-5 liability, it
had determined that the issue was not appropriately before it in ChiarellaA6 and
had split evenly on the theory's validity in Carpenter v. United States.67 In
O'Hagan, however, the Court finally settled the question by holding that the
misappropriation theory as described above "satisfies § 10(b)'s requirement that
chargeable conduct involve a 'deceptive device or contrivance' used 'in
connection with' the purchase or sale of securities."68
Rule lOb-5 differs substantially from section 16 in that it focuses on
individual securities transactions rather than on regulating a whole class of
transactions. This tighter regulatory aim has both positive and negative
consequences. As with any bright-line rule, section 16 is overbroad and
generalized in application, while Rule lOb-5 is able to distinguish between facially
similar situations to consider the merits of a particular case. However, this makes
liability more difficult to prove under Rule lOb-5 than under section 16, making it
a more expensive, if more just, avenue for litigation.
Rule lOb-5 has a broader reach than section 16, because it is not limited
to either statutorily defined insiders or to section 12 companies. It focuses directly
on insider trading that meets its fraud regime, rather than using the position of the
trader and the timing of the transactions as proxies for an inquiry into the facts.
But Rule lOb-5 may also be narrower than section 16 in one sense because it does
not impose liability for trading on inside information without disclosing the
information to the other party to the trade unless there is a breach of fiduciary
duty.
65. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207.
66. See supra note 60.
67. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
68. OHagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2208.
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2. Section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3
Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is designed to
prevent fraud in connection with tender offers.69 Pursuant to section 14(e), the
SEC promulgated Rule 14e-3 70 in 1980, which is similar to, but both broader and
narrower than, Rule lOb-5. Rule 14e-3 deems it a "fraudulent deceptive or
manipulative act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e)" for any person
in possession of material information relating to [a] tender offer
which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and
which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or
indirectly from (1) the offering person, (2) the issuer of the
securities sought...by such tender offer, or (3) any officer, director,
partner or employee or any other person acting on behalf of the
offering person or such issuer, to purchase or sell.. .any of such
securities.... unless within a reasonable time prior to any purchase
or sale such information and its source are publicly disclosed... 71
Rule 14e-3 is narrower than Rule lOb-5 in that it applies only to tender
offers, not to all securities transactions. But Rule 14e-3 is broader than Rule lOb-
5 in that it does not require that any relationship exist that would create a duty to
disclose the information or abstain from trading.72 Until recently, there had been
considerable discussion in the courts as to whether the SEC exceeded its
rulemaking authority when it promulgated Rule 14e-3, but the United States
Supreme Court has now held that the rule is valid.73
69. Section 14(e) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection
with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any
solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such
offer, request, or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of
this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means
reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994).
70. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1997).
71. Id.
72. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 557 (2d Cir. 1991) (in banc).
73. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2214. Before the O'Hagan decision, three appeals
courts had found that the SEC did not exceed its rulemaking authority. See SEC v. Maio, 51
F.3d 623, 634-35 (7th Cir. 1995); SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1165-67 (10th Cir. 1992);
Chestian, 947 F.2d 551. However, one appeals court had found that the SEC did exceed its
authority by redefining fraud to exclude the requirement of breach of fiduciary duty. United
States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
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When compared with sections 16 and 10(b), does Rule 14e-3 provide
additional deterrence of insider trading, or is it merely duplicative? For officers
and directors, Rule 14e-3 does not appreciably expand the scope of their liability
to their shareholders because they already owe fiduciary duties to those
shareholders, so Rule lOb-5 would apply. Rule 14e-3 might provide additional
liability in a situation in which officers and directors of one company trade in the
securities of another company, on the theory that they would not owe fiduciary
duties to the security holders of the other company. The other section 16 insiders,
10% shareholders,74 would not generally owe fiduciary duties to the issuer's other
shareholders unless they are considered "controlling" shareholders.75 Thus, they
would not be subject to Rule lOb-5 liability for nondisclosure of material inside
information.76 Therefore, Rule 14e-3 should provide additional deterrence of
insider trading by noncontrolling 10% shareholders.
3. Section 13(d) and Schedule 13D
Subsection (d) of section 13 of the 1934 Act77 was added in 1968 as part
of the Williams Act.78 The Williams Act was intended to regulate tender offers and
to provide more information to shareholders of target companies, but its
application is broad enough to require substantial purchasers to provide
information on their acquisitions, even if the purchasers are not contemplating
tender offers. Specifically, section 13(d) requires any person or group who
acquires more than 5% of a class of equity securities registered under section 12 to
report the acquisition to the SEC, the issuer, and the exchanges on which the
security trades. 79 The report, on Schedule 13D, must disclose information about
74. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1994).
75. See, e.g., Freese v. Smith, 428 S.E.2d 841, 847 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) ("As a
general rule, shareholders do not owe a fiduciary duty to each other or to the corporation.
However, this rule is not without exception." (citation omitted)); Zahn v. Transamerica
Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 43 (3d Cir. 1947) (The court held that, whether they are directors or
controlling stockholders, "those in charge of a corporation stand in a fiduciary relation to its
minority stockholders."); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (holding
that, as a controlling shareholder, Sinclair owed a fiduciary duty to its majority-owned
subsidiary, Sinclair Venezuelan Oil Company ("Sinven"), and that, when it engaged in a
transaction with Sinven that permitted Sinclair to receive a benefit to the exclusion and
detriment of Sinven's minority shareholders, it had an obligation of "intrinsic fairness," that
is, the burden of proof that its transactions with Sinven were objectively fair).
76. That is, unless they misappropriated the information, see O'Hagan, 117 S.
Ct. 2199 (holding that a lawyer who traded on misappropriated information acquired from
his firm's client was guilty of Rule lOb-5 violations), or breached a duty in using it, see
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (holding that the employee of a financial
printer was not liable under Rule 1Ob-5 for trading on material nonpublic information
because he owed no fiduciary duty to the issuer or its shareholders).
77. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1994).
78. Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 2, 82 Stat. 454,454-55 (1968).
79. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d)(l).
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the acquiring person or group, the funds used to make the acquisitions, and the
acquirer's purpose in acquiring the securities.8 0 It must be filed within ten days
after the acquirer's beneficial ownership exceeds 5% of the class of securities,8 1
and it must be "promptly" amended82 whenever there is any material change in its
contents. A material change in ownership is defined as one that increases or
decreases the filer's holdings by 1% or more. 83
The reporting requirements of section 13(d) operate much as the
reporting requirements of section 16 do, in that they publicize trading activity. As
section 13(d) requires a report within ten days after the filer becomes a 5%
beneficial owner, it requires a filing much sooner than section 16. It requires
filings of smaller holders (5%) than section 16 (10%), so it casts a wider net for
substantial beneficial owners. However, section 13(d) does not require officers and
directors who are not 5% holders to file reports of their trades, so it does not
provide the publicity with respect to those trades that section 16 does. This is a
significant shortcoming because management trades are generally better
information regarding company value than are substantial outsider trades, unless
the outsiders are planning a coup. Managers have better information than outsiders
do, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and they also have much greater capacity
to be instrumental in their company's future than a nonemployee, 5% shareholder.
4. Restricted Stock and Rule 144
The 1933 Act generally prohibits the offer or sale of securities without
registration, but provides exemptions from the registration requirements for
various transactions or types of securities. Corporate employees frequently acquire
unregistered securities from their companies as part of their compensation.
Although the initial transfer from the company to the employee may be exempt
from registration, these securities are "restricted" because they cannot be resold by
the employee without either registration or an exemption from registration. Both
sales by "affiliates"84 of either registered or restricted securities and sales by
80. Id. § 13(d)(1)(A)-(E).
81. Id. § 13(d)(1).
82. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(a) (1997).
83. Id.
84. "An 'affiliate' of an issuer is a person that directly, or indirectly through one
or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with, such
issuer." 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(1) (1997). "Control" is defined in Rule 405 to mean "the
possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the
management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities,
by contract, or otherwise." Id. § 230.405 (1997). Whether an officer, director, or 10%
shareholder has "control" sufficient to be an "affiliate" is a question of fact, but the general
view is that there is a presumption that such persons are affiliates unless they prove
otherwise. See 3 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURMES REGULATION 3D.2.a.(i), at 1514
(3d ed. 1995). The SEC commented in a 1972 letter:
[A] person's status as an officer, director, or owner of 10% of the voting
securities of a company is not necessarily determinative of whether such
1997] 1335
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nonaffiliates of restricted securities may be accomplished without registration
through the safe harbor of Rule 144.85 Rule 144 provides a mechanism for the
seller to avoid classification as an "underwriter" 86 and thereby makes available the
exemption from registration provided by section 4(l) of the 1933 Act.87
Although the adoptive release for Rule 144 does not specify the
restriction of insider trading as one of the rule's purposes, it does include the
prevention of fraud,88 and the rule's effect is in some ways similar to that of
section 16(b). Rule 144 requires that restricted securities, or any securities sold by
affiliates, be held for at least one year.89 Even after the holding period is satisfied,
the securities may be sold only in quantities unlikely to affect the market price
until they have been held for at least two years, at which time nonaffiliates may
sell without regard to volume limitations.9 0
These holding period and "trickle-out" provisions, even if not enacted for
.the same reasons, are likely to mirror some of the consequences of section 16's
six-month profit prohibition. They should also create some of the same incentive
effects as section 16(b). Insiders who must hold their securities for a significant
period and who, thus, cannot sell them into the market quickly have an increased
incentive to work for the long-term profitability of their company. The sales
restrictions are also likely to diminish trading based on nonpublic information
person is a control person.... [S]tatus as a control person.. .must be
determined by considering other relevant facts in accordance with the
test set forth in Rule 405....
American-Standard, [1972-73 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,071 (Oct.
11, 1972).
85. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144.
86. Underwriter is defined very broadly in section 2(11) of the 1933 Act to
include anyone who acquires securities from the issuer "with a view to, or offers or sells for
an issuer in connection with,... or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in"
their distribution. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1 1) (1994).
87. Section 4(l) exempts from the registration requirement "transactions by any
person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer." Id. § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1994).
88. See Notice of Adoption of Rule 144, Securities Act Release No. 33-5223
(Jan. 11, 1972), available in 1972 WL 18134.
Rule 144 is designed to implement the fundamental purposes
of the Act as expressed in its preamble: "To provide full and fair
disclosure of the character of the securities sold in interstate commerce
and through the mails, and to prevent fraud in the sale thereof...." The
rule would also operate to inhibit the creation of public markets in
securities of issuers concerning which adequate current information is
not available to the public.
Id.
89. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d).
90. Id. § 230.144(k). Note that the one-year and two-year holding periods
referred to here were amended in 1997; prior to that time, the holding periods were two and
three years, respectively. See Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rules 144 and
145, Securities Act Release No. 33-7390, 62 Fed. Reg. 9242, 9244-45 (1997) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230).
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whose value is limited in time because they limit insiders' abilities to time their
sales.
B. Other Federal Laws
1. Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes
The federal mail fraud9i and wire fraud92 statutes have proven to be
helpful in criminal prosecutions of insider trading.93 In a celebrated case, a Wall
Street Journal reporter named Foster Winans collaborated with several others to
trade on information he created for an investment advice column94 before it was
published.95 He was prosecuted under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule
10b-5 but also under the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes. The District Court
convicted Winans on all charges,96 and the Second Circuit affirmed,97 finding
section 10(b) violations based on a misappropriation theory.98 The United States
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994) provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud,...for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice
or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository
for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by
the Postal Service,...or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or
thing,.. .shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
92. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994) provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to deiise any scheme or artifice
to defraud,.. .transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire,
radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce,
any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
93. Neither the mail fraud nor the wire fraud statutes provides an express, or
gives rise to an implied, private right of action. See, e.g., Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 611
F.2d 1170, 1179 (6th Cir. 1979) (The paucity of legislative intent or any other kind of
evidence indicating intent to create a private cause of action forces this court to conclude
Congress did not intend to create a private cause of action for plaintiffs under the Mail
Fraud Statute."); Napper v. Anderson, Henley, Shields, Bradford & Pritchard, 500 F.2d
634, 636 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding no private cause of action under Wire Fraud Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1343).
94. There is some irony in prosecuting Winans for leaking information that
would be published in a column entitled Heard on the Street.
95. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
96. United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd in part
sub nom. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986).
97. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 19
(1987).
98. The misappropriation theory permits courts to find violations of Rule I Ob-5
in the absence of a fiduciary relationship between the trader and the issuer by locating a
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Supreme Court affirmed the mail and wire fraud convictions.99 The Court split
evenly on the securities law claims, so the Second Circuit's decision on those
claims was left intact.100 It was therefore not clear until recently whether the
Supreme Court would recognize misappropriation as a valid theory of liability
under section 10(b).101 It was clear, however, that the mail and wire fraud statutes
could provide alternative means for prosecuting insider trading.O2 The viability of
mail and wire fraud as causes of action to deter insider trading was affirmed by the
United States Supreme Court in O'Hagan, a closely watched 1997 decision.103
2. RICO
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO")104 is
a broad umbrella statute allowing criminal prosecution and civil proceedings by
breach of fiduciary duty elsewhere. See supra text accompanying note 65. In Carpenter,
Winans owed a duty to his employer, the Wall Street Journal, which had an explicit policy
forbidding th6 disclosure of information before its publication. Winans was aware of the
policy and in fact had reported occasional leaks in the past. The appeals court found that
Winans' breach of duty to his employer constituted a breach of fiduciary duty upon which a
Rule lOb-5 action could be based. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1034.
99. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 27.
100. Id. at 24.
101. It is now clear that misappropriation is a valid theory for criminal liability
under Rule 1Ob-5. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997); supra notes 61-
68 and accompanying text.
102. Mail fraud was also used in United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d
Cir. 1991) (in banc). Chestman was another insider trading case in which Rule 1Ob-5 was
problematic. Chestman, a stock broker, received inside information from a customer that
the customer had received from his wife. The court found that the customer owed no
fiduciary duty to his wife, and hence had not breached a duty by disclosing the information
to Chestman. Id. at 570-71. Under the holding in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), a
tippee breaches a fiduciary duty only when the tipper breached a duty in disclosing the
information to the tippee. Therefore, Chestman was not liable under Rule lOb-5 or under
the mail fraud statute. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 571.
The same fraudulent scheme that underlay the Rule 10b-5 convictions
also was the basis for the mail fraud convictions. A scheme to
misappropriate material nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary
duty of confidentiality may indeed constitute a fraudulent scheme
sufficient to sustain a mail fraud conviction.... However, whatever
ethical obligation.. .[the customer owed to his family], it was too
ethereal to be protected by either the securities or mail fraud statutes.
Id. Chestman's Rule 14e-3 conviction was affirmed because it did not require a showing of
any breach of fiduciary duty. See infra Part III.A.2.
103. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997). As in Chestman, the
O'Hagan appellate court had struck down the mail fraud, wire fraud, and Rule 1b--S
convictions, United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 628 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct.
2199 (1997), but the Supreme Court reinstated them, O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2220.
104. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
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the Attorney General0s as well as private rights of action06 against persons who
engage in a pattern of racketeering activityo7 involving violations of specified
state or federal statutes that constitute "predicate offenses."108 To prove a RICO
case, the prosecutor or plaintiff must allege one or more of four categories of
"prohibited activities."109 These prohibited activities include investing ill-gotten
gains in any enterprise which is engaged in or whose activities affect interstate or
foreign commerce, acquiring an interest in such an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity, conducting the affairs of such an enterprise through a pattern
of racketeering activity, or conspiring to violate any of these prohibitions.,10
Securities fraud is listed among the offenses that are predicate offenses for RICO
liability.", However, when Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995,112 it limited private plaintiffs' resort to RICO by eliminating
securities fraud as a predicate offense for private actions unless the securities fraud
has resulted in a criminal conviction of the defendant.13 Outside the context of a
105. Id. §§ 1963-1964.
106. Id. § 1964. Note that plaintiffs may use RICO to bring actions for violations
of other statutes that themselves do not provide a private right of action. See, e.g., Delta
Educ., Inc. v. Langlois, 719 F. Supp. 42, 50 (D.N.H. 1989) ("RICO specifically provides
for a private cause of action, see 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), and its existence does not affect the
availability of an implied private cause of action for mail fraud. The plaintiff may allege
mail fraud as the predicate acts for its RICO claim, but the mail fraud allegations
themselves do not state a separate cause of action.").
107. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). The "pattern of racketeering activity" element requires
that the defendant have engaged in at least two acts defined as predicate offenses and that
the acts establish a threat of continued racketeering activity. See, e.g., Fujisawa Pharm. Co.
v. Kapoor, 115 F.3d 1332, 1338 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing the meaning of "pattern" under
RICO); In re Motel 6 Sec. Litig., [1997] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,454 (S.D.N.Y.
1997), available in 1997 WL 154011, at *4 ("Whether... [predicate] acts establish a threat
of continued racketeering activity depends on the facts of each case...." (citation omitted)).
108. The predicate offenses are listed under the definition of "racketeering
activity." Several have been useful in dealing with insider trading. "As used in this
chapter...'racketeering activity' means.. .(B) any act which is indictable under any of the
following provisions of title 18, United States Code:...section 1341 (relating to mail fraud),
section 1343 (relating to wire fraud),.. .(D) any offense involving.. .fraud in the sale of
securities...." 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994).
109. Id. § 1962.
110. Id.
111. See generally Arthur F. Mathews, Shifting the Burden of Losses in the
Securities Markets: The Role of Civil RICO in Securities Litigation, 65 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 896, 943 (1990) (discussing the availability of RICO in securities fraud cases).
112. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
113. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c) (West Supp. 1997).
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate
United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he
sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee,
except that no person may rely upon any conduct that would have been
1997] 1339
1340 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1315
private action, however, securities fraud remains available to prosecutors as a
RICO predicate offense.
3. Other Laws
Although the statutes and rules mentioned above are perhaps the most
often employed means of deterring trading on material nonpublic information,
there are no doubt other laws that could be pressed into service, given appropriate
facts. For instance, in addition to mail fraud, wire fraud, and Rule lOb-5 counts,
the federal conspiracy statute 14 was successfully used to prosecute Foster Winans
and David Carpenter when they entered into a scheme to trade on information
developed for Winans' Heard on the Street column before the column was
published in the Wall Street Journal115 James O'Hagan was prosecuted not only
under Rules 1Ob-5 and 14e-3 but also under the federal mail fraudl6 and money
laundering'17 statutes.118
C. State Laws
1. Blue Sky Laws
Some states' securities laws provide for criminal and/or civil liability for
insider trading. One such state is California, which provides for civil liability
against any insider who purchases or sells a security when the insider is in
possession of material nonpublic information about the issuer that would
actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a
violation of section 1962. The exception contained in the preceding
sentence does not apply to an action against any person that is criminally
convicted in connection with the fraud, in which case the statute of
limitations shall start to run on the date on which the conviction
becomes final.
Id.
114. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
115. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
117. Id. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), 1957 (1994).
118. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997). O'Hagan was convicted
of money laundering, as well as mail fraud and securities fraud, but the money laundering
convictions were reversed by the Eighth Circuit because it concluded that the securities
fraud counts on which the money laundering charges were based were insupportable. See
United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1996) ("The mail fraud counts are
structured in the indictment to hinge on the validity of the securities fraud counts, and the
money laundering counts in turn are dependent upon the mail fraud or securities fraud
counts. Accordingly, we vacate all of O'Hagan's convictions."). The Supreme Court has
now reinstated the securities law and mail fraud convictions, but the United States did not
seek review of the money laundering convictions, so the Supreme Court did not reinstate
those convictions. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2219 n.24.
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significantly affect the security's market price.19 An insider is defined to include
the issuer itself or any officer, director, or controlling person or other person
whose relationship to the issuer provides access to information about the issuer
that is not generally available to the public.120 Damages for violation of these
provisions are measured by the difference between the price paid and the value of
the securities if the market had processed the nonpublic information in advance of
the trade.121 California also provides for recovery by the issuer from the inside
trader of up to three times the difference between the transaction price and the
market value of the securities if the market had incorporated the inside
information.122
119. California's statute includes the following provisions:
It is unlawful for an issuer or any person who is an officer,
director or controlling person of an issuer or any other person whose
relationship to the issuer gives him access, directly or indirectly, to
material information about the issuer not generally available to the
public, to purchase or sell any security of the issuer in this state at a time
when he knows material information about the issuer gained from such
relationship which would significantly affect the market price of that
security and which is not generally available to the public, and which he
knows is not intended to be so available, unless he has reason to believe
that the person selling to or buying from him is also in possession of the
information.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25402 (Deering 1996).
Any person who violates Section 25402 shall be liable to the
person who purchases a security from him or sells a security to him, for
damages equal to the difference between the price at which such security
was purchased or sold and the market value which such security would
have had at the time of the purchase or sale if the information known to
the defendant had been publicly disseminated prior to that time and a
reasonable time had elapsed for the market to absorb the information,
plus interest at the legal rate, unless the defendant proves that the
plaintiff knew the information or that the plaintiff would have purchased
or sold at the same price even if the information had been revealed to
him.
Id. § 25502 (Deering 1996).
120. Id. § 25402.
121. Id. § 25502.
122. Id. § 25502.5. This liability will be reduced by any amounts paid by the
defendant pursuant to an SEC proceeding under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984.
Id. § 25502.5(b). The section also provides that the defendant is liable for reasonable costs
and attorney fees. Id. § 25502.5(a). The action may be brought either directly by the issuer
or derivatively by a shareholder of the issuer. Id. Section 25502.5 applies only to issuers
with more than $1,000,000 in assets and a class of equity securities held by at least 500
persons. Id. § 25502.5(d).
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Another Blue Sky Law cause of action is available in states that have
adopted the Uniform Securities Act.123 Section 501 of the Uniform Securities
Act124 is nearly identical to Rule lOb-5, and section 605125 of the Act provides an
express private right of action for violation of section 501(2).126 One such state is
Washington. 127 Cases arising in Washington have limited the right to sue to the
123. UNW. SEC. AcT (1956) (superseded 1985), 7B U.L.A. 509 (1985). The
Uniform Securities Act was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and originally released for adoption by the states in 1956. It requires
issuers to register or seek an exemption from registration for their securities offerings, id. §
301; it requires securities professionals to register, id. § 201; it creates civil and criminal
liability for fraud and other violations, id. §§ 409-410; and it establishes an agency to
administer the Act, id. § 406. Thirty-nine states have adopted the Act in part or in its
entirety; two major exceptions are New York and California. See Louis Loss,
COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SEcURiTEs Acr (1976), for an analysis of the Act. The Act
was substantially revised in 1985, but the revised version has not received wide acceptance.
See Mark A. Sargent, Some Thoughts on the Revised Uniform Securities Act, 14 SEc. REG.
L.J. 62 (1986). Although the Act is called a "uniform" act, in fact, many states have
adopted it with substantial variations. See id. at 74.
124. UNIF. SEC. Acr (1985) § 501 (amended 1988), 7B U.L.A. 144 (Supp. 1997).
In connection with an offer to sell, sale, offer to purchase, or
purchase, of a security, a person may not, directly or indirectly:
(1) employ a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(2) make an untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made not
misleading, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made;
or
(3) engage in an act, practice, or course of business that
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon a person.
Id.
125. Id. § 605, 7BU.L.A. 151 (Supp. 1997).
(a) A person who offers to sell or sells a security in violation
of Section...501(2)...is liable to one who purchases the security from
that person. Upon tender of the security, the purchaser may recover the
consideration paid ... and interest at the legal rate.. .from the date of
payment, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees as determined by the
court, less the amount of income received on the security.... A purchaser
who no longer owns the security may recover damages.
Id. § 605(a).
126. Note that the Act only permits a purchaser to sue a seller; it does not provide
for a cause of action by the seller when the purchaser acts in violation of section 501. See
id. § 605.
127. Washington's counterpart to section 501 of the Uniform Security Act is
found at section 21.20.010 of the Washington Revised Code, and its counterpart to section
605 of the Uniform Securities Act is at section 21.20.430 of the Washington Revised Code.
§ 21.20.010. Unlawful offers, sales, purchases
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express private right of action provided.128
2. Common Law Actions Based on Fraud, Agency, or Breach of
Fiduciary Duty
As it has been used to handle insider trading, Rule lOb-5 is similar to a
common law fraud cause of action.1 29 For fraud, the plaintiff must prove that (1)
the defendant acted with scienter3O in misrepresenting the truth to the plaintiff (or
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale
or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly:
(1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading; or
(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
WASH. REv. CODE § 21.20.010 (1989).
§ 21.20.430. Civil liabilities-Survival, limitation of actions-Waiver
of chapter void-Scienter
(1) Any person who offers or sells a security in violation of
any provisions of RCW 21.20.010...is liable to the person buying the
security from him or her, who may sue either at law or in equity....
(2) Any person who buys a security in violation of the
provisions of RCW 21.20.010 is liable to the person selling the security
to him or her, who may sue either at law or in equity....
WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430 (1989).
128. See Wade v. Skipper's, Inc., 915 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1990); Ludwig v.
Mutual Real Estate Investors, 567 P.2d 658 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977), overruled en banc on
other grounds by Kittilson v. Ford, 608 P.2d 264 (Wash. 1980).
129. Chapter 22 (Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure Causing Pecuniary Loss)
of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1976) outlines the various causes of action and
criteria for proving aprimafacie case in tort for fraud. The principal liability provision is
section 525 (Liability for Fraudulent Misrepresentation).
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion,
intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain
from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in
deceit for pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon
the misrepresentation.
Id. § 525.
130. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS defines a "fraudulent"
misrepresentation as one in which its maker:
(a) knows or believes that the matter is not as he represents it
to be,
(b) does not have the confidence in the accuracy of his
representation that he states or implies, or
(c) knows that he does not have the basis for his representation
that he states or implies.
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in failing to disclose information, if the defendant had a duty to the plaintiff to
make such disclosure),31 (2) the defendant intended the plaintiff to rely on the
misrepresentation, (3) the plaintiff did in fact rely on the misrepresentation and
(4) the plaintiff suffered pecuniary harm as a result. 32
One problem with common law fraud as a basis for an insider trading suit
is that the defendant generally has not made any representation to the plaintiff, true
or false. In a normal market trade, the defendant places an order with his or her
broker to buy or sell securities. The plaintiff independently places an order with
his or her broker to buy or sell securities, and the fact that the two orders result in a
matched trade is sheer happenstance.
Even if the defendant makes no affirmative misstatement, however, the
plaintiff may be able to prevail under a common law fraud theory. A
misrepresentation may be understood to include an omission when there is a duty
to speak.133
Under agency or fiduciary duty theories, the plaintiff would assert that
the defendant's status as an officer, director, or controlling shareholder creates a
duty to act solely for the benefit of the corporation and its shareholders, and not
for the insider's own benefit. This duty would obligate the insider to disclose any
nonpublic information that provided a bargaining advantage to the insider before
he or she traded in the company's securities. Therefore, the fiduciary relationship
would create a duty to disclose, and failure to disclose would then fulfill the
"misrepresentation" element of a fraud action.
Goodwin v. Agassiz134 was a case brought under this theory. Agassiz was
the president and director of Cliff Mining Company; his codefendant
Id. § 526. The concept defined here is the same as what the courts call scienter. See id. §
526 cmt. a.
131. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
132. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 525.
133. See id. § 551.
(1) One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may
justifiably induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a business
transaction is subject to the same liability to the other as though he had
represented the nonexistence of the matter that he has failed to disclose,
if, but only if, he is under a duty to the other to exercise reasonable care
to disclose the matter in question.
(2) One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to disclose to the other before the transaction is
consummated,
(a) matters known to him that the other is entitled to know
because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and
confidence between them; and
(b) matters known to him that he knows to be necessary to
prevent his partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from
being misleading....
134. 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933).
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MacNaughton was a director and general manager. They were aware of a
geologist's theory that the company's land might contain copper deposits, and they
believed that, if the theory proved accurate, the company's value would increase
substantially. Consequently, they bought shares of the company's stock through
the Boston Stock Exchange. Goodwin, a Cliff shareholder, sold his shares in
response to a newspaper article indicating that the company had ceased certain
exploratory operations. There was no evidence that the defendants were
responsible for the article or had any awareness that they were purchasing stock
formerly owned by Goodwin. However, Goodwin alleged that the defendants had
breached a duty to him as a company shareholder when they purchased his stock
without disclosing to him the information that led them to believe that the
company had good prospects. The case was decided before Congress passed the
1934 Act. The plaintiff lost in part because there was no contact between the
plaintiff and defendant and the trade was accomplished on an open, impersonal
exchange135 and in part because the court seemed to believe that the information
was too speculative to require disclosure.136
In Strong v. Repide,137 however, the plaintiff was able to state a cause of
action without an affirmative misrepresentation. Repide, a director and the
majority shareholder of a corporation, bought shares from Strong, another
shareholder. He used a series of intermediaries to make the purchase in order to
hide his identity; as a result, he made no misrepresentations to her. Repide was
negotiating the sale of some of the company's real estate, and he knew the sale
would substantially increase the value of the stock. In fact, the price he paid for
Strong's shares was only about one-tenth of the value of the company's stock
shortly after the sale was accomplished. Strong sued, and the United States
135.
The stock.. .was bought and sold on the stock exchange. The identity of
buyers and sellers.. .was not known to the parties and perhaps could not
readily have been ascertained. The defendants caused the shares to be
brought through brokers.... They said nothing to anybody as to the
reasons actuating them. The plaintiff was no novice. He was a member
of the Boston stock exchange.... He acted upon his own judgment.... He
made no inquiries of the defendants or of other officers of the company.
Id. at 661-62.
136.
The only knowledge possessed by the defendants not open to the
plaintiff was the existence of a theory formulated.. .by a geologist as to
the possible existence of copper deposits.... Whether that theory was
sound or fallacious, no one knew.... At the annual meeting of the
stockholders..., no reference was made to the theory. It was then at most
a hope, possibly an expectation. It had not passed the nebulous stage....
Disclosure of the theory, if it ultimately was proved to be erroneous or
without foundation in fact, might involve the defendants in litigation
with those who might act on the hypothesis that it was correct.
Id. at 661.
137. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
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Supreme Court concluded that she had stated a cause of action.138 The Court found
that even if Repide was under no duty to disclose his general knowledge regarding
the stock's value, the "special facts" of this case, 139 including Repide's position as
a director, principal shareholder, and negotiator in the sale, created a duty to
disclose the information or abstain from trading in the stock.140
Aside from the general common law principals that impose fiduciary
duties of loyalty and good faith on officers, directors, and controlling shareholders,
federal securities laws and jurisprudence have also made it clear that insiders have
a duty to effectively disclose material nonpublic information before they trade on
it.141 States have adopted similar or identical standards of disclosure and
materiality. Therefore, breach of a duty to disclose may assist plaintiff in
establishing a prima facie case, and lack of an affirmative misrepresentation may
not be a serious bar to plaintiff's ability to state a cause of action in fraud under
state law. 142
138. Id. at 434-35.
139. Id. at 431.
140. Id. at 432-33; see also Bailey v. Vaughan, 359 S.E.2d 599, 605 (W. Va.
1987) ("[W]e are drawn to the conclusion that a director, who solicits a shareholder to
purchase his stock and fails to disclose information not known to the shareholder that bears
upon the potential increase in value of the shares, shall be liable to the shareholder either to
have the sale rescinded or to respond in damages.").
141. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
[A]nyone in possession of material inside information must either
disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it
in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so,
must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned
while such inside information remains undisclosed.
Id. at 848.
142. See, e.g., Zim v. VLI Corp., 681 A.2d 1050 (Del. 1996) In Zirn, VLI
shareholders asserted that the VLI directors had failed to make full disclosure in federal
tender offer materials, impairing shareholders' ability to make an informed decision as to
whether to. tender, and giving rise to a state law claim for "equitable fraud." (The Delaware
Supreme Court had previously noted that "the only difference between common law fraud
and equitable fraud is 'Chancery's willingness to provide a remedy for negligent or
innocent misrepresentation."' Gaffin v. Teledyne, Inc., 611 A.2d 467, 472 n.4 (Del. 1992)
(quoting Stephenson v. Capano Dev., Inc., 462 A.2d 1069, 1074 (Del. 1983)).) The Zirn
court discussed the duty of directors to disclose information to shareholders, stating that
"the duty of disclosure 'represents nothing more than the well-recognized proposition that
directors of Delaware corporations are under a fiduciary duty to disclose fully and fairly all
material information within the board's control when it seeks shareholder action."' Zirn,
681 A.2d at 1056 (quoting Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992)). The court noted
that Delaware had adopted the federal securities law definition of materiality as articulated
in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976), and continued, "In.
addition to the traditional duty to disclose all facts material to the proffered transaction,
directors are under a fiduciary obligation to avoid misleading partial disclosures." Zirn, 681
A.2d at 1056.
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The plaintiff may have other avenues of attack, as well. If the defendant
did not affirmatively misrepresent facts to the plaintiff, one alternative is a
corporate derivative action using an agency theory. When insiders sold their stock
before news of declining earnings became public, the court in Diamond v.
Oreamuno143 approved this line of attack to require the insiders to disgorge their
profits back to the corporation. The case was allowed to go forward even though
the complaint lacked any specific allegation of damages to the corporation. The
court itself generously allowed an inference of harm, and even supplied the
rationale for the inference, positing that the insider trading might have damaged
the corporation's reputation for integrity, harming the "continued public
acceptance and marketability of its stock."144
In Diamond, officers and directors of Management Assistance, Inc. knew
that the company's earnings had declined substantially. Several of them sold
56,500 shares of the company's stock at an average price of $28 per share. After
the drop in earnings was disclosed to the public, the market price of the stock
dropped to $11, and a shareholder brought a derivative action to compel the
insiders to disgorge their profits to the company. 145 The court acknowledged that
section 16 was inapplicable, because the insiders had held their stock for longer
than six months.146 It also found section 10(b) to be problematic, because,
although plaintiff could allege the elements of a Rule lOb-5 claim, the damages
were not individual to the plaintiff, and at the time of this case, the federal courts
had not worked out the machinery for class actions under Rule lOb-5.147
Accordingly, the court believed that the federal securities laws would not help the
plaintiff. However, the New York Court of Appeals permitted the shareholder to
proceed with the derivative action under state law, even though, as in Goodwin,
the trades had taken place through the impersonal medium of the market.148 The
court allowed the suit under principals of agency law that require an agent who
uses confidential information acquired in the course of employment for the agent's
own benefit rather than the principal's benefit to account to the principal for any
profits realized.149 Even though the plaintiff could not allege any particularized
143. See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969).
144. Id. at 912. Other courts have been less expansive. See, e.g., Schein v.
Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739, 746 (Fla. 1975) (The court required that "actual damage to the
corporation must be alleged in the complaint to substantiate a stockholders' derivative
action.").
145. Diamond, 248 N.E.2d at 911.
146. Id. at 914.
147. Id. at 914-15.
148. See id. at 915; cf. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933)
(discussed supra at notes 134-36 and accompanying text).
149. Diamond, 248 N.E.2d at 914 (quoting the RSATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
AGENCY § 388 cmt. c (1958)). The comment from the restatement states, "if [a corporate
officer] has 'inside' information that the corporation is about to purchase or sell securities,
or to declare or to pass a dividend, profits made by him in stock transactions undertaken
because of his knowledge are held in constructive trust for the principal." REsTATEmENT
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pecuniary harm to the company, the court found that the defendants' actions might
have harmed the company by damaging its reputation for integrity. "When officers
and directors abuse their position in order to gain personal profits, the effect may
be to cast a cloud on the corporation's name, injure stockholder relations and
undermine public regard for the corporation."150
D. Section 16(b) Liability Should Be Eliminated
Section 16(b) liability should be eliminated because it is ineffective,
unjust, expensive, and unnecessary. As discussed in Part II.C, above, section 16(b)
is of very limited usefulness in controlling or punishing insider trading, even in the
absence of any other enforcement mechanism. In addition to its general
ineffectiveness, it causes unjust results by acting as a trap for the unwary rather
than any real deterrent to a determined inside trader. Although it may have some
minimal tendency to align insiders' incentives with the long-term profitability of
their companies by encouraging them to be long-term holders of their companies'
securities, on a cost/benefit balance, its costs outweigh its benefits.
Section 16(b) imposes costs not only on insiders; compliance with the
rules promulgated under section 16 imposes significant costs on issuers. Because
section 16(b) as written would require reporting of and impose liability for
transactions that are unlikely or impossible to involve the use of inside
information, the SEC has passed rules that exclude certain transactions deemed not
to pose such a threat. The most complex of these is Rule 16b-3, which governs
stock option plans.151
Many companies use stock options as incentive compensation for their
employees and directors. Giving those persons an ownership stake in the company
is intended to align their incentives with those of the other shareholders and
thereby encourage them to work harder to make the company profitable.152 But
such plans pose problems under section 16. Is the grant of an option or an exercise
of the option a purchase? If the insider is a member of the board committee that
grants the options, does that change the answer? If an officer holds stock options
for ten years and then, when the market price of the stock is high, exercises them
and sells the underlying stock, is the exercise and sale a purchase and sale for
purposes of section 16? These and other knotty issues have led to repeated
rulemaking and have resulted in complex procedures for corporations to set up
their compensation plans to comply with section 16(b). If section 16(b) liability
were ended, one collateral benefit would be the decrease in corporations' costs of
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 cmt. c. The Diamond court did not deal with how to measure
the profit that must be disgorged: the spread between the purchase price and the eventual
low point; the spread between the sale price and the eventual low point; the spread between
the purchase price and the sale price?
150. Diamond, 248 N.E. 2d at 912.
151. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (1997).
152. Sed supra note 34.
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compliance with the intricate and ever-changing rules promulgated under section
16.
Section 16(b) liability becomes even more unnecessary, and thus even
less justifiable, when considered in light of the panoply of federal and state statutes
and common law doctrines discussed above53 that are available to combat the
problems presented by insider trading. Since these other laws are more effective,
more narrowly targeted, and produce fairer results than section 16(b) (because
they focus on transactions actually motivated by inside information), section 16(b)
should be rescinded. If, as some commentators have suggested, section 16(b)
provides important benefits in the form of incentive effects and agency cost
reductions by encouraging insiders to be long-term security holders,154 perhaps
Congress should replace section 16(b) with a simple holding period, providing that
insiders who acquire their companies' equity securities may not sell them for a
specified period. But, as discussed above, Rule 144 accomplishes much the same
resultl55 so an independent holding period imposed by section 16 is also probably
unnecessary.
IV. SECTION 16(a) AND THE VALUE OF REPORTED INFORMATION
A. Market Efficiency
An efficient market is one in which information is rapidly incorporated
into the price of goods sold in that market.15 6 Generally, markets become more
efficient as their size increases and as information costs and transactions costs
decrease. As a result, the capital markets in the United States, where millions of
shares change hands daily, are relatively efficient.
However, to say that information is rapidly incorporated in the price of
stock sold on the New York Stock Exchange says nothing about what kind of
information does or is likely to affect stock prices. Factors that make information
instrumental in moving prices include its verifiability, its timeliness, and the
accuracy with which traders can predict its impact on the issuer's fortunes. In the
stock market, information likely to affect the price of a share of stock may include
information specific to the company, information about the industry in which the
company operates, and information about the economy generally. Market analysts
153. See supra Part III.A-C.
154. See supra note 29.
155. See supra Part III.A.4.
156. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons from Financial Economics:
Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017,
1023 (1991) (The authors commented that "one frequently used approach to defining
efficient markets focuse[s] on the information incorporated in the price of securities." The
authors also noted that "the most common definition [of an efficient market] calls it a
'market in which prices fully reflect available information."' (quoting EUGENE F. FAMA &
MERTON H. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE ch. 2 (1972))).
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and arbitrageurs constantly search for and trade on information that they believe
will affect securities values, and prices adjust in response to that trading activity.
Irrelevant information may also have an impact on market prices; this
sometimes is referred to as "noise trading."157 Noise trading may result from a
misperception of the ramifications of relevant information or from a "jump on the
bandwagon" approach to following other traders' activities, thus exacerbating the
price movements their trading would ordinarily create. It also may result from
information unrelated to the value of a particular security, such as trading in
response to perceived "patterns" in market movement.
An efficient market carries with it the inference that prices incorporate all
available information. If information is quickly incorporated into market prices,
then those prices should reach an equilibrium among all traders' perceptions of the
significance of the information. When information is withheld from the market
and is not incorporated into securities prices, prices may become inaccurate. At
least one commentator has posited that efficiency of a market may not be a
particularly valuable end itself, as long as the inefficiency that exists is unbiased;
that is, as long as the information withheld from the market has an equal tendency
to push prices higher as it does to push them lower.158 This kind of inefficiency
would not create an investor perception of "rigged" or unfair markets, in the sense
that securities were consistently underpriced or sold at inflated prices. However, to
the extent that existing information is undisclosed, those persons in possession of
the nonpublic information have the opportunity to profit from it by trading on it
before its disclosure impacts securities prices. This perception that insiders can and
do take unfair advantage of their access to nonpublic information was exactly what
the drafters of the securities acts were trying to dispel by providing for a system of
regular, extensive disclosure.
B. Section 16(a) Reporting
1. Why Section.16(a) Information Is Valuable to the Market
The thesis that an insider's trades have informational value is easily
defended. First, those in command of the management of a company have access
to both the largest quantity of information and the most reliable information about
the company's status and prospects. Even without illegally trading on "material"
nonpublic information, their regular and ongoing contacts with the company, the
industry, and the company's employees put insiders in a much better position than
157. See Andrei Schleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach
to Finance, . ECON. PERSP., Spring 1990, at 19, 23 ("Some shifts in investor demand for
securities are completely rational.... But not all demand changes appear to be so rational;
some seem to be a response to changes in expectations or sentiment that are not fully
justified by information.... We use the term 'noise traders' to describe such investors....").
158. See Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic
Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 613 (1988).
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outsiders to gauge a whole host of intangible factors that may contribute to the
company's success or failure. Second, insiders have much greater power than
outsiders to actually cause the success or failure of the company. To the extent that
they can and will be instrumental in charting the company's future course, their
actions with respect to buying or selling the company's securities may at least
provide information about their incentives and intentions, if not their capability to
ensure their desired outcome.
Information that an insider has bought or sold shares of her company's
stock is, in one sense, very dependable information, because it is absolutely
factual, historical information, incapable of manipulation or distortion. However,
in another sense, it may be very undependable. Disclosure of the fact of a
transaction without disclosure of the reasons for the transaction permits the market
to completely misunderstand or misinterpret the significance of the information. It
is probably not workable to require insiders to disclose the motivation for their
trades, and even if workable, it might be an unjustifiable invasion of their privacy.
Even though the information regarding a single insider trade is of uncertain
significance, however, insider trades in the aggregate provide valuable information
about insiders' predictions of company values. As a consequence, Congress should
continue to require insiders to report their trades in their companies' securities.
Does information that insiders have traded constitute information about
the company at all? Is the mere fact that an insider has bought or sold stock in her
company information that is relevant to the market? If so, it is not the same sort of
information as a financial statement reporting the company's income or a news
release reporting an impending merger. It is at best secondary information. It may
disclose insiders' opinions as to the value of the stock, but it does not disclose the
facts upon which those opinions are based. As a general rule, the news that an
insider has purchased stock provides more content than the news that an insider
has sold stock.
a. Stock Sales
Assume that the president of a small public company sells $20,000 worth
of her $50,000 investment in her company's stock. As required by section 16, she
files a Form 4 reporting the transaction within ten days after the beginning of the
month following the trade. Investors now have access to the information that she
has sold a significant amount of her holdings in her company's stock. Should they
follow her lead and sell their stock in the company? It depends on why she sold.
Perhaps she lacks confidence in the company's prospects. She is not
trading on specific nonpublic information, which would be illegal, but rather on
opinions and impressions gleaned from her association with her company's
industry, its personnel, and the marketplace. Based on her experience, she thinks
the price of her company's stock will fall, and she plans to place her money in
investments that she believes will have higher returns. If that is why she sold,
outside investors are justified in following her lead; after all, her close association
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with the company and its management puts her in a much better position than they
to judge a whole range of intangibles.
Perhaps she believes that the company is not necessarily going to do
badly but that it is likely to be volatile, and she is at a point in her career where she
wants to move more of her capital into lower risk investments such as government
bonds. If this is her rationale, investors may or may not be justified in following
her lead, depending on their individual investment situations and the degree to
which they are risk averse.
Perhaps her sale has nothing to do with her company's prospects. Maybe
she wants to diversify her investments out of a concentration in her own
company's stock. Many officers and directors are partly compensated in stock or
stock options. As a result, they may acquire substantial blocks of their company's
securities, and over time, their investment portfolios may become heavily
weighted in favor of those securities. Lack of diversification, however, is risky.
Therefore, even if she believes her company's securities are a sound investment in
general, a prudent investor would be likely to sell some of those securities in order
to diversify her holdings. An outsider would be mistaken to rely on her sale as an
indication that he also should sell his shares unless he, too, happened to be
overinvested in that security.
Perhaps the sale reflects a need for liquidity-she needs cash to buy a
new car or boat, or to pay her child's college tuition. In these situations, her trades
would provide no reliable information to investors who might follow her lead.
Another possibility is that the decision to sell is driven by tax
considerations. For instance, if an insider has a loss in one security and a gain in
another, the insider may decide to sell both in order to net out the capital gain and
loss in a particular year.159
b. Stock Purchases
The information that an insider has purchased company stock should be
less subject to misinterpretation. Assuming the insider is a rational investor, a
purchase should indicate that the insider believes the company's stock is a better
alternative than any other investment. If the insider believes there is more money
to be made elsewhere, she is likely to put her money there.
There may be exceptions to this analysis. Some insiders may buy stock to
comply with regulatory requirements (for instance, directors of national banks
159. One time that this arises is when a company engages in a cash-out merger.
The company's shareholders receive cash instead of stock in the merged company, so they
must realize the difference between their basis in the stock given up and the cash received.
One way to avoid tax liability if this cash results in a gain is to sell another security whose
trading price is lower than the shareholder's basis, and offset the gain in one security with
the loss in the other.
1352 [Vol. 39:1315
RETHINKING SECTION 16
must own stock in their banks).160 Some insiders may be partly compensated in or
contractually required to purchase their company's securities, in order to more
closely align their interests with those of the shareholders. Some insiders may
purchase shares to take advantage of stock options that will soon expire. And there
may be purchases by insiders who are not required to purchase, but who believe
that it is good public relations to own a significant stake in their companies.
However, it seems likely that an insider purchase is a more reliable indicator of an
insider's assessment of his or her company's prospects than an insider sale.
The inside information on which insiders can trade with impunity is
arguably some of the most valuable information about the company-impressions
and opinions built up by long exposure to the details of the day-to-day operations
of the company and interactions with its personnel. These "impressionistic" views
as to the future vitality of the company's business and earnings are not necessarily
event oriented; they may not relate to a specific merger possibility or new product
development. However, insider trades based on this "nonmaterial" inside
information are a source of valuable information to the market.161
2. Decrease in Value of Information Because of Delay
Currently, section 16(a) requires insiders to file reports of their trades by
the tenth day of the month after the month in which the trades occur. An insider
who trades at the beginning of a month would not be required to report that trade
for as long as forty days. If disclosure of trades is required only to permit the
identification and capture of short-swing profits, then this delay is unimportant. If,
however, the rationale for disclosure is broader, and includes informing the market
of the fact of insider trades, then the delay in reporting is very important.
Studies have indicated that the American securities markets are capable
of incorporating new information into prices with astounding speed.162 Every time
160. See 12 U.S.C. § 72 (1994).
Every director must own in his or her own right, either shares of the
capital stock of the association of which he or she is a director the
aggregate par value of which is not less than $1,000, or an equivalent
interest, as determined by the Comptroller of the Currency, in any
company which has control over such association... [unless]... the capital
of the bank does not exceed $25,000,.. .[in which case the minimum
ownership requirement is].. .not less than $500, or an equivalent
interest....
Id.
161. Therefore, to the extent that section 16(b) discourages such trades from
taking place at all, it prevents information from reaching the market that would assist
traders in making informed decisions about securities values.
162. There are numerous studies to this effect. See, e.g., James A. Patell & Mark
A. Wolfson, The Intraday Speed of Adjustment of Stock Prices to Earnings and Dividend
Announcements, 13 J. FIN. EcoN. 223 (1984) (noting that information concerning dividends
and earnings causes price changes in securities within minutes after the information is
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a security price impounds new information, the price becomes a more accurate
price, based on an informed consensus of the significance and import of the
information. Therefore, to the extent information that would impact prices is
withheld from the market, prices are correspondingly "inaccurate."
As mentioned previously, it can be argued that this inaccuracy is
unimportant, as long as there is no bias; that is, the withheld information is as
likely to result in higher prices as it is in lower prices.163 To the extent the
inefficiency creates risk, investors can avoid the risk by diversifying their
portfolios. This view ignores the costs in diversifying (brokerage fees, information
costs to determine whether one is sufficiently diversified, etc.). It also ignores the
reality that people prefer to be in control of their environments as much as
possible, and that they generally prefer certainty to uncertainty. To the extent that
the law encourages market efficiency, it fosters more rational pricing, which
should make the market a more attractive option for investors. If the market
becomes more attractive, more people are likely to invest. As more people invest,
the cost of capital for companies should decrease, and as those costs decrease, so
should the prices of goods and services. Therefore, laws that encourage prompt
disclosure should have a salutary effect on the market.
3. Availability of EDGAR to Solve Problem of Delay
The SEC's Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR)
system is now fully operational.164 Companies must file all of their registration
statements and periodic reports electronically, rather than on paper. Once the
information is transmitted to the SEC, it is available to the public over the Internet
released but also noting that price effects may persist for as long as two days); see also
Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Komhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and
Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 821 n.160 (1985) (citations to several
empirical studies).
163. See Stout, supra note 158, at 701 ("[T]he issues of fraud and efficiency are
not the same.... While fraud harms average returns, pricing inefficiency per se does not, so
long as the investor has an equal chance of gaining or losing.").
164. The EDGAR system has been in development for several years. The SEC
began with a test group of filers to develop procedures for electronic filing of documents
and developed a schedule that incrementally required companies to switch from paper
filings to electronic filings. The system became fully mandatory for all domestic registrants
whose filings are subject to the review of the SEC's Division of Corporate Finance on May
6, 1996, when the last group of companies was required to begin making filings on-line.
See Securities Act Release No. 33-7369, 63 S.E.C. Docket 869 (Dec. 5, 1996), available in
1996 WL 699505.
Initially, access to EDGAR filings was restricted by a contract the SEC entered
into with a private corporation, which digested the information available and charged
access fees to those who wanted to view the information. That also has changed. EDGAR
filings are freely available to everyone with access to the Internet, and they may also be
accessed for a charge through LEXIS/Nexis.
1354 [Vol. 39:1315
1997] RETHINKING SECTION 16 1355
twenty-four hours after the filing date.165 Reports under section 16 may be, but are
not required to be, transmitted over the EDGAR system.
Perhaps one reason that section 16 filings are not yet required to be filed
through EDGAR is that they are the individual responsibility of the insiders, rather
than the responsibility of the company. While companies and their financial
printers may have access to and expertise with the technology and equipment
required to make electronic filings, many individuals may not. However,
individual filers should be able to rely on their companies to help them secure
access to whatever means of communication are necessary to accomplish
electronic filings, even if the individuals are not equipped themselves to
accomplish the filings.
During EDGAR's development, there was considerable thought and
debate over how to authenticate filings, since there would be no way for the
officers and directors 'of companies to physically "sign" the documents
electronically transmitted to the SEC. A system of personal identification numbers
was developed to allow filers to "sign" filed documents by affixing their PIN.
Therefore, individual filers will be able to authenticate their EDGAR filings by
including their number.
4. Recommendations for Revision of Section 16(a)
Section 16(a) reports provide valuable information to the market166 and to
the SEC. Therefore, insiders should continue to be required to report their trades in
their companies' securities. However, section 16(a) reports would be considerably
more valuable, both to the market and to the SEC, if the information were
available in a more timely fashion. Therefore, the statute should be amended to
require trading reports .to be filed much sooner.
Insiders currently must report each trade167 by the tenth day of the month
following the month in which their trade occurred, 168 allowing a delay of up to
forty days if a trade takes place at the beginning of the month. We can assume
reasonably that at least some insider trades are based on assessments related to
timing-even if a trade is not based on specific nonpublic material information, it
may be based on an insider's conclusion that the company's stock price is
currently too high or too low, leading the insider to sell or buy in response to the
perceived inaccuracy of the price. Over a forty-day lag between the trade and the
report, either the stock price may change or the insider's conclusion as to the
165. EDGAR filings may be viewed on the Internet at either
http://www.sec.gov/edgarhp.htm or at http://www.sec.gov/cgi-binlsrch-edgar. Internet
access to filed information is available 24 hours after filing; LEXIS/Nexis access is
available simultaneously with filing.
166. See supra Part IV.B.1.
167. Although some exceptions do exist for small trades or trades that do not
require reports. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
168. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1994).
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stock's value may change. As a result, the information is a much less trustworthy
indication of an insider's value assessment when disclosed to the market after the
long delay than it was at the time of the trade.
Section 16(a) reports are valuable to the SEC, as well as to the market.
Although this Article recommends that section 16(b) be repealed, section 16
would continue to deter illegal insider trading because the section 16(a) reports
can assist in the enforcement of other insider trading laws. Section 16(a) reports
enable the SEC to pinpoint insider trades that occur shortly before material
disclosures and are thus more likely to have been executed while the insider was in
possession of material, nonpublic information. Quicker reporting would thus be
beneficial for insider trading enforcement, as well as for informing the market of
insiders' opinions of securities values. The sooner such information is in the hands
of the SEC, the sooner it can act to enjoin or prosecute insider trading activity.
Prompt enforcement of the insider trading laws should promote the effect that
Congress intended when it first enacted section 16-that of promoting confidence
in the fairness of the securities markets.
There are two ways in which the delay between trading and reporting can
be diminished: shortening the time between trading and filing, and using a faster
method of transmitting the filing. Congress and the SEC should take advantage of
both methods to create the largest benefit to the market.
Several possibilities exist for reducing the time for reporting: the filing
could be required sooner after a trade, concurrent with a trade, or even in advance
of a trade.169 The best alternative is the middle ground; filing should be concurrent
with trading. Decreasing the time between trading and filing decreases but does
not eliminate the decline in value of the information contained in the reports. The
earlier the information is available, the more value it has. However, requiring a
filing in advance of trading could operate as a significant deterrent to trades by
insiders at all because it would reduce their opportunity to profit from their
informed conclusions about their companies' value.
Why should we not require pretrade reporting? If, as posited in this
Article, insiders' trades have informational content that the market values, then
169. Several commentators have considered these possibilities in the past. See,
e.g., Marleen A. O'Connor, Toward a More Efficient Deterrence of Insider Trading: The
Repeal of Section 16(b), 58 FORDHAM L. R v. 309, 354-55 (1989) (recognizing that
"[r]equiring section 16 insiders to file section 16(a) reports on or before the day they trade
would take into account the market's sensitivity to the information provided by insider
trading upon nonmaterial information" (footnote omitted)); Report of the Task Force, supra
note 35, at 1102 (noting that Senator Chafee had introduced a bill in 1985 to require
insiders "to report their purchases and sales of their companies' stocks on the same day as
the transaction" and recommending "that voluntary purchase or sale transactions be
reported on form 4 within two business days of the transactions, and that involuntary
changes in ownership remain subject to the current monthly reporting requirements");
Samuelson, supra note 15, at 523 (proposing that insiders should "report sales or purchases
of stock, not after the event, but at least ninety days prior to any trade").
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their purchases tend to push prices up, and their sales tend to push prices down.
The information on which insiders may trade legally, and which is indirectly
disclosed in section 16(a) reports, is not "material" information as that term is used
in the securities laws;170 rather, it is soft or impressionistic information, probably
not capable of being disclosed to the public in any cogent manner. Therefore, if
this information is not disclosed indirectly through trading reports, it may not be
available to the market at all. Requiring insiders to report before they trade would
allow the market to react to the news before the insider actually made the trade.
But if market prices adjust before insiders trade, then insiders cannot reap the
benefits of their assessments of their companies' value, based on their experience
and knowledge. If insiders must share their insights with the market by
prereporting their trades, they will have less incentive to trade. To the extent they
are deterred from trading, their valuation conclusions will never be transmitted to
the market in the form of trading reports.
Therefore, although requiring a trading report sooner after trading
improves the situation, it would not prevent a significant loss in value of the
information that insiders have traded. Requiring a pretrade report may decrease the
incentive to trade, thus preventing information about insiders' assessments of
value from reaching the market at all. Concurrent filing, then, is the best
alternative.
Because the SEC's EDGAR system is available to permit concurrent
filing, section 16(a) reports can be conveyed immediately to the SEC and to the
markets, preserving the maximum value of the information provided by the
trading reports. But should section 16(a) also be amended to require the trading
,reports to provide more information than they do now? As discussed above, 171 the
information provided by section 16(a) reports is ambiguous because there are
reasons other than pure valuation decisions that motivate securities trading. Should
insiders be required to report their motivations for trading their companies'
securities? No.
First, it is impractical to attempt to require such information because of
the nature of the information itself. Instead of being based on quantifiable or
factual information (which is largely already available to the market), insiders'
trades are merely indications of their conclusions, based on accretions of
impressions, opinions, and observations over a period of association with a
company. These conclusions frequently cannot be explained in language of the
accuracy, specificity, and completeness required under the securities laws to avoid
liability for misleading or incomplete statements. Therefore, attempted disclosure
of their motivations could subject insiders to liability for material misstatements or
omissions.
170. See supra note 49 (meaning of materiality as defined by the Supreme Court
in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)).
171. See supra Part lV.B.1.
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Second, requiring insiders to disclose their motivations for trading in their
companies' securities is an unwarranted invasion of their privacy. Although
Congress has determined that insiders do not have the right to keep the fact of their
trades in their companies' securities private, the details of their finances are not
and should not be public information unless the value of the information to the
public significantly outweighs the imposition on insiders.
Does the insider definition in section 16 include the appropriate group, or
should it include additional or fewer persons? As presently defined, statutory
insiders probably include most persons who are likely to be in a position to
develop informed opinions about a company's prospects aid to be in a position to
influence the company's future performance. There may be exceptions; for
instance, persons involved in research and development within a company might
in certain circumstances be aware of developments that are not yet "material" but
cumulatively portend good or bad things for the company's future. However, such
instances of lower-level employees having the breadth of information to make
accurate predictions about the company's performance as a whole would be less
frequent and less reliable than the opinions of the current group of insiders.
Therefore, the definition should not be significantly broadened or narrowed.
How should concurrent filing be accomplished technically? Probably the
simplest and most certain method is to require insiders to effect any trades in their
companies' securities through the company itself, so that the company would
handle both the trade and the report. Section 12 companies are already adept at
using the EDGAR system and have access to it, so using the company as a trading
and reporting facilitator would lighten the insiders' burden of reporting and
provide a single conduit for information about each company's insiders.
In addition, requiring trades and reports to be channeled through the
issuer could actually help to prevent illegal insider trading and could also prevent
trading that might appear to be illegal. A company could prevent illegal insider
trades by refusing to execute an order by an insider known to be in possession of
material inside information. It could also prevent trades that are not based on
nonpublic information but that may appear to be. For instance, some insiders may
be unaware of material developments that have not yet been announced to the
public. If the uninformed insider attempts to place a trading order, the company
could request or require that the order be postponed until after disclosure of the
material information, thus preventing any inquiry into the insider's access to or
awareness of the information at the time of the trade.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress should repeal section 16(b). It is both unfair and ineffective in
achieving its stated goal of deterring insider trading. It is overinclusive in that it
traps unwary investors who are not using inside information, and it is
underinclusive in that it permits wary insiders who are using inside information to
avoid its penalties by timing their trades to occur outside the six-month period.
Other laws deal with insider trading in a much more direct, focused, and effective
1358 [Vol. 39:1315
19971 RETHINKING SECTION 16 1359
manner, so section 16(b) is unnecessary to prevent or sanction insider trading. The
private enforcement mechanism is expensive and wasteful, and it does not
effectively restore "ill-gotten gains" to the issuer.
Insider trading reports provide valuable information to the market, but the
value of that information declines with delay. Therefore, Congress should retain
section 16(a) but should modify it to require insiders to file trading reports
concurrent with their trades. Concurrent electronic filing is now practical, since the
EDGAR system is fully operational. Unlike advance filing, concurrent filing will
not create trading disincentives that would keep insiders from sharing their
perceptions with the market through their trades. Concurrent filing will permit
share prices to react to insider trades more quickly, and it will assist the SEC in
detecting illegal insider trades by permitting more timely monitoring.

